I started off working on some core topics in the philosophy of language, like reference and indexicality. Then I turned to thinking about lying, deception, and obfuscation. More recently, I've been thinking that there's no one answer to questions like ‘What does this term refer to in this context?’ but rather a range of good answers suited to different theoretical purposes. If that's right, I think it raises some thorny questions about how we should understand the project of semantics. Along the way, I've also done some work on fake news, deception, speech acts, abilities, colors, Frege, and the ethics of eating animals. For a more extensive overview of my work circa 2017, please see the interview I did in 3:16 Magazine.
Relevance-Based Knowledge Resistance, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, forthcoming in Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments (eds. Åsa Wikforss and Jesper Strömbäck), Routledge [abstract].
On Salience-Based Theories of Demonstratives, with Ethan Nowak, forthcoming in Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry (ed. Sophie Archer), Routledge [abstract].
Tolerating Sense Variation, with Mark Textor, forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy [abstract].
Meta-metasemantics, or The Quest for the One True Metasemantics, with Ethan Nowak, forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly [abstract].
Speaker's Reference, Semantic Reference, Sneaky Reference, forthcoming in Mind & Language [abstract].
Who's Your Ideal Listener?, with Ethan Nowak, forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy [abstract].
Why We Should Keep Talking About Fake News, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, forthcoming in Inquiry [abstract].
Online Speech, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, The Philosopher's Magazine 94(3): 90-95, 2021.
Lying, Deception, and Epistemic Advantage, with Andreas Stokke, in The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language (eds. Justin Khoo and Rachel Sterken), Routledge: 109-124, 2021 [abstract].
Daylight Savings: What an Answer to the Perceptual Variation Problem Cannot Be, with Jonathan Cohen, Philosophical Studies 178(3): 833-843, 2021 [abstract].
The Big Shill, with Robert Simpson, Ratio 33(4): 269-280, 2020 [abstract].
Discourse and Method, with Ethan Nowak, Linguistics & Philosophy 43(2): 119-138, 2020 [abstract].
What's New About Fake News?, with Jessica Pepp and Rachel Sterken, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16(2): 62-94, 2019 [abstract].
Reference, with Marga Reimer, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2019 Edition.
Lying, Testimony, and Epistemic Vigilance, in The Oxford Handbook of Lying (ed. Jörg Meibauer), Oxford University Press: 214-228, 2018 [abstract].
The Lies We Tell Each Other Together, in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics (eds. Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke), Oxford University Press: 183-205, 2018 [abstract].
Ethics for Fish, with Andrew Reisner, in The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics (eds. Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett), Oxford University Press: 189-206, 2018 [abstract].
The Lying Test, Mind & Language 31(4): 470-499, 2016 [abstract].
Doing Without Believing, with Michael Brownstein, Synthese 193(9): 2815-2836, 2016 [abstract].
Act Consequentialism and Inefficacy, in Food, Ethics, and Society (eds. Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett), Oxford University Press: 210-214, 2016 [abstract].
A Kantian Response to Futility Worries?, in Food, Ethics, and Society (eds. Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett), Oxford University Press: 215-218, 2016 [abstract].
Shifty Characters, Philosophical Studies 167(3): 519-540, 2014 [abstract].
Indexicality and the Answering Machine Paradox, with Jonathan Cohen, Philosophy Compass 8(6): 580-592, 2013 [abstract].
Justice for Unicorns, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society 112(3): 351-360, 2012 [abstract].
Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, co-edited with Andreas Stokke, Oxford University Press, 336pp, 2018.
Review of Shelly Kagan's How to Count Animals, more or less, forthcoming in The Philosophical Review.
Critical Notice of Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris, and Matt Moss' (eds.) New Work on Speech Acts, with Elsa Brisinger, Analysis 79(4): 783-790, 2019.
Review of Keith Allen's A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour, Analysis 78(3): 580-583, 2018.
Review of Alessandra Giorgi's About the Speaker, Mind 125(498): 562-565, 2016.
Review of Jennifer Saul's Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, Journal of Moral Philosophy 13(4): 491-494, 2016.
Introduction to Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, with Andreas Stokke, in Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, Oxford University Press: 1-21, 2018.
Introduction for Inquiry Symposium on Imagination and Convention, with Josh Armstrong, Inquiry, 59(2): 139-144, 2016.